NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/11

Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

1 May 2017

Original: English

First session
Vienna, 2 May-12 May 2017

Steps to promote the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East

Report by Canada

1. At the seventy-first session of the General Assembly, Canada joined consensus on resolution 71/29, in which the Assembly called for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Canada abstained on resolution 71/54, entitled "Towards a nuclear-weapon free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments" in which the Assembly, inter alia, called on States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to work towards the full implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. Canada voted against resolution 71/83, entitled "The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East". Canada's concern with that resolution is that it remained unbalanced, unfairly singling out Israel by calling for its accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty while failing to address serious nuclear non-compliance issues by other States in the region. We stress that a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) must be established on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by States in the region.

2. Canada is committed to advancing the outcomes of the 2010 Review Conference, including a conference on a WMD-free zone in the Middle East. Canada expresses its ongoing support for the three convenors to consult broadly with all relevant stakeholders to arrive at modalities for a conference and ensure a successful conference, to be attended by all States in the region on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at. However, it is important to remind ourselves that any WMD-free zone should be negotiated by States in the region for States in the region, with support from other actors as requested.

3. Canada has called for the universal and full adherence and compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty by States in the Middle East. At the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Canada actively supported the adoption of a resolution on the application of safeguards in the Middle East by the IAEA General Conferences in 2005 and 2006. Canada regrets that it was unable to support this annual resolution from 2007 to 2016, given that changes presented by the drafters

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were not the result of a consensus approach and because the resolution during that time period did not address serious breaches in compliance with Non-Proliferation Treaty safeguards requirements by some other States in the region, as determined by IAEA and reported by the Agency to the Security Council. Canada has also worked with other States within the context of successive IAEA General Conferences to prevent unhelpful and politically motivated resolutions from having a negative impact on efforts aimed at establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

4. Canada notes that, unfortunately, not all States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in the region have ratified a comprehensive safeguards agreement with IAEA. Canada appeals to all States in the region to contribute further to regional stability and security by concluding additional protocols to their respective comprehensive safeguards agreements, which Canada considers the current verification standard pursuant to article III of the Treaty. We urge those States in the region that have signed an Additional Protocol to ratify it without further delay.

5. With regard to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, Canada co-sponsored resolution 71/86 at the seventy-first session of the General Assembly, as well as Security Council resolution 2310 (2016), adopted in September 2016, and continues to encourage all States in the region, particularly those listed in annex 2 to the Treaty, to ratify the Treaty as a confidence- and security-building measure. Canada is also working to construct, test and certify a radionuclide monitoring station as a Contributing National Facility to strengthen the capacity of the Treaty's International Monitoring System to verify compliance with the Treaty.

6. Canada welcomes the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action agreed between the five plus one group (P5+1) and Iran in July 2015, as well as Implementation Day, which took place on 16 January 2016, following the confirmation by IAEA that Iran had implemented the necessary "up-front" commitments. While Canada remains seriously concerned about Iran's long-term nuclear ambitions, given its history of nuclear proliferation and its ongoing ballistic missile programme, we believe that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action can effectively constrain Iran's nuclear programme, so long as the Plan of Action is fully and verifiably implemented. Since 2014, Canada has contributed $10 million to support IAEA verification of Iran's implementation of its commitments under the Join Comprehensive Plan of Action. Iran must fully implement all of the commitments it agreed to under the Plan of Action in order to build the international community's confidence that Iran's nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful in nature. Canada welcomes Iran's provisional application of the Additional Protocol to its Non-Proliferation Treaty Safeguards Agreement but urges Iran to ratify the Additional Protocol as an additional confidence-building measure.

7. Canada remains deeply concerned about findings that point to possible undeclared nuclear material, facilities and activities in Syria, which suggest nuclear cooperation between Syria and North Korea, in contravention of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Canada fully supported the resolution adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors Resolution (GOV/2011/41), in which the Board requested the IAEA Director-General to report to the United Nations Security Council the assessment that an undeclared nuclear reactor existed at Dair Alzour, in breach of Syria's safeguards obligations. While recognizing the challenges posed by the current security situation in Syria, IAEA continues to report that the Assad regime has failed to provide the cooperation, information and access necessary to address Syria's outstanding compliance issues. We continue to call on Syria to urgently remedy its non-compliance and to meet its own commitment to "fully cooperate with the Agency to resolve related outstanding issues", so that the Agency can provide the necessary assurances as to the exclusively peaceful nature of Syria's

nuclear programme. Local authorities must provide access to the Agency to all of the sites requested. We also continue to urge Syria to bring into force an Additional Protocol as soon as possible. It is only through full, transparent and proactive cooperation with IAEA that Syria can restore confidence with respect to the scope and nature of its nuclear programme.

8. Canada continues to call on all remaining States not party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to join as non-nuclear-weapon States. As a confidence-building measure in advance of this ultimate goal, Canada has also called on these same States to separate civilian and military fuel cycles and to place all civilian nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards. These statements are in conformity with both the policies and actions of Canada, which include Canada's voting record on the resolutions at the seventy-first session of the General Assembly, which are referenced in paragraph 1 of this report.

9. Canada recognizes the growing interest in nuclear energy among States parties in the Middle East and welcomes the announcements made by a number of such States concerning new initiatives in this field. In welcoming these initiatives, we note that all nuclear power programmes should be accompanied by the strongest commitments to nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear safety and nuclear security.